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AFRICANIZATION AND THE REFORM
OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
LAW
Olabisi D. Akinkugbe *
Abstract
Recent trends in reforms by African states in the field of
International Investment Law (“IIL”) have been dubbed as the
Africanization of IIL. These important debates regarding reform of IIL
in Africa foreground innovative aspects of International Investment
Agreements (“IIA”) in contrast to the traditional IIL regime. The
debates also remind us of the relative lack of African voices in the global
IIL reform agenda. There is, however, little research that critically
analyzes the Africanization of IIL thesis. This article undertakes this
analysis. Drawing on TWAIL, this article characterizes Africanization
of IIL into “moderate” and “radical” reforms. The article analyzes the
normative features of Africanization of IIL. In this regard, it enriches
existing substantive analysis, and advances the debates by
interrogating the contours and blind spots of Africanization in IIL. It
argues that the Africanization thesis, being so far limited to the IIAs
between African states, is a “moderate” response from below to the
systemic inequities of the IIL regime. Moderate Africanization of IIL —
a modest and incremental approach to the reform of IIL — engenders
challenges for African states as they remain nestled in the neoliberal
paradigm. To address this deficit and expand the geographies of African
centered IIAs to reform and remake IIL, this article makes the case for
a cascading of the Africanization thesis in more radical normative form
based on a constellation of strategic moderate changes.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

This article critically analyzes the on-going reforms in International
Investment Law (“IIL”) and policy in Africa and questions the extent
to which the reforms address and remake the systemic issues in the field
of IIL. IIL is enmeshed in the long history of an imperial economy. The
field is notorious for the complicity of investors in the host states and
the controversies that they generate. 1 At the heart of any critique of
IIL is a rejection of the post-colonial continuities of the technologies of
governance and the asymmetry that characterizes foreign investor
relations in the host states. 2 An expanded understanding of the empire
as a practice and structure of unequal international integration reveals
the enduring continuities between Global North and Global South. 3
Skepticism and backlash of IIL have grown simultaneously with
existential debate about its own legitimacy. 4 First, the empirical
1.

See generally Ibironke T. Odumosu, The Antinomies of the (Continued)
Relevance of ICSID to the Third World, 8 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 345,
SCHNEIDERMAN,
RESISTING
ECONOMIC
346
(2007);
DAVID
GLOBALIZATION:
CRITICAL
THEORY
AND
INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW, 1–2 (David Cowan ed., 2013). M. SORNARAJAH,
RESISTANCE AND CHANGE IN THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN
INVESTMENT (Cambridge Univ. Press ed. 2015).

2.

See, e.g., Upendra Baxi, Postcolonial Legality: A Postscript from India,
45 VERFASSUNG UND RECHT IN ÜBERSEE/LAW & POLITICS IN AFR.,
ASIA & LATIN AMERICA 178, 193 (2012); David Schneiderman, The
Coloniality
of
Investment
Law,
SSRN
(May
21,
2019),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3392034
[https://perma.cc/3VWG-4CMQ]
(exploring the continuities of colonialism and inquiring into the question
whether the legal rules in the post-colony are in service of the economic
interest of the metropolitan).

3.

See generally ADOM GETACHEW, WORLDMAKING AFTER EMPIRE: THE
RISE AND FALL OF SELF-DETERMINATION 31–32 (2019).

4.

See generally David Schneiderman, International Investments Law’s
Unending Legitimation Project, 49 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 229 (2017); Julian
Arato, The Private Law Critique of International Investment Law, 113
AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 2 (2019) (Demonstrating how IIL and ISDS displace
and distort national private law across the fields of property law,
contracts, corporations, and intellectual property, and laying the
foundation for a refocused project of reform).
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evidence on the interconnectedness of foreign investment to economic
growth in host states is contested. 5 Critics have argued that foreign
investment law entrenches the imperial and capitalist interests of
multinational corporations at the detriment of host states. 6 Contrary
to the promise of spurring economic development in developing
countries, IIL entrenches the interests of investors. 7 The dilemma
regarding the value of foreign investment to their economic
development thus persists. 8 In some cases, this has generated backlash
through dissenting legislation. 9 Second, dispute regimes in IIL have
been effectively used in pursuit of the interests of investors. 10 The
5.

For example, Ghana has been attracting most of its investments from
countries with which it does not have investment treaties. If investment
treaties were that crucial or singular in attracting investments, Ghana
and similarly placed African countries would probably not attract
investments from countries with which they have not entered into
investment treaties. See Dominic Npoanlari Dagbanja, Can African
Countries Attract Investments Without Bilateral Investment Treaties?
The Ghanaian Case, 40 AUSTRALASIAN REV. AFRICAN STUD. 71 (2019);
Gus Van Harten, Five Justifications for Investment Treaties: A Critical
Discussion, 2 TRADE L. & DEV. 19 (2010).

6.

See generally JOHN LINARELLI ET AL., THE MISERY OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW: CONFRONTATIONS WITH INJUSTICE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY,
5 (2018); SCHNEIDERMAN, supra note 1, at 28; Jean Ho, The Creation of
Elusive Investor Responsibility, 113 AJIL UNBOUND 10 (2019) (arguing
that elusive investor responsibility was created by omission, with injurious
consequences that highlight the need to alter, rather than accept, the
status quo).

7.

See GUS VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND
PUBLIC LAW 3, 8 (Vaughan Lowe ed., 2007); Michael Waibel et al., The
Backlash Against Investment Arbitration: Perceptions and Reality
(Kluwer L. Int’l Working Paper, 2010).

8.

Samuel K. B. Asante, International Law and Foreign Investment: A
Reappraisal, 37 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 588, 616 (1988).

9.

For example, Tanzania has proposed a series of investment reforms across
various fields given the perception of unfairness against it. See Tanzania
Overhauls Mining Laws, Fines Investor US$190 Billion: Is Your
Investment Protected?, JONES DAY: INSIGHTS (Aug. 2017),
https://www.jonesday.com/en/insights/2017/08/tanzania-overhaulsmining-laws-fines-investor-us190-billion-is-your-investment-protected
[https://perma.cc/54K8-7FXV]. See also Dilini Pathirana, Sovereign
Rights to Natural Resources as a Basis for Denouncing International
Adjudication of Investment Disputes: A Reflection on the Tanzanian
(Sept.
11,
2020),
Approach,
AFRONOMICSLAW
https://www.afronomicslaw.org/2020/09/11/sovereign-rights-to-naturalresources-as-a-basis-for-denouncing-international-adjudication-ofinvestment-disputes-a-reflection-on-the-tanzanian-approach/
[https://perma.cc/LDQ2-PQCZ].

10.

Antony Anghie, International Law in a Time of Change: Should
International Law Lead or Follow?, 5 AM. UNIV. INT’L L. REV. 1316,
1360 (2011).
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Investor-State Dispute Settlement (“ISDS”) regime is fraught with a
myriad of challenges appropriately encapsulated in the regime’s bias
critique. 11 The ISDS system’s challenges arise from its transparency
crisis, questions about the independence of arbitrators, contradictions
between arbitral awards, underrepresentation of African arbitrators,
and concerns relating to costs and time of arbitral procedures. 12 Third,
critical voices from the Global South — Africa in particular — have
been marginalized in the ongoing ISDS reform process. 13
For over a decade now, regional, sub-regional and national legal
reforms across Africa have been at the forefront of IIL. 14 These reforms
center at the interests of African states and seek to address their
subordinate position in the global economic hierarchy. 15 The reforms
incorporate rules for sustainable development, protection of the
environment, and the rights of the marginalized. 16 The 2007 Investment
Agreement for the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
(“COMESA”) Common Investment Area (“CCIA”) set African states
on the oath of regional investment reforms. 17 Most recently, the Pan11.

See id.; see also James Thuo Gathii, Third World Approaches to
International Economic Governance, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
THIRD WORLD, RESHAPING JUSTICE 255, 261 (Richard Falk,
Balakrishnan Rajagopal & Jacqueline Stevens eds., 2008).

12.

Lorenzo Cotula & Terrence Neal, UNCITRAL Working Group III: Can
Reforming Procedures Rebalance Investor Rights and Obligations?,
SOUTH CENTRE (Mar. 2019), https://www.southcentre.int/wpcontent/uploads/2019/03/IPB15_UNCITRAL-Working-Group-III-CanReforming-Procedures-Rebalance-Investor-Rights-and-Obligations_EN1.pdf [https://perma.cc/V28X-UMHS].

13.

Won Kidane, Africa’s International Investment Law Regimes, OXFORD
BIBLIOGRAPHY
(Apr.
22,
2020),
https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo9780199796953/obo-9780199796953-0198.xml
[https://perma.cc/7A35E899]; James Thuo Gathii & Olabisi D. Akinkugbe, Symposium
Introduction: Centering Voices from the Global South on Investor-State
Dispute Settlement Reform: A Debate, AFRONOMICSLAW, (Sept. 7, 2020),
https://www.afronomicslaw.org/2020/09/07/symposium-introductioncentering-voices-from-the-global-south-on-investor-state-disputesettlement-reform-a-debate/
[https://perma.cc/89FQ-TM6Y]
(introducing six essays that debate and center perspectives from the
Global South on Investor-State Dispute Settlement Reform and
categorizing them into defenders of the ISDS regime and contributions
that are critical of the system and seek reform).

14.

See Schneiderman, supra note 2, at 1.

15.

Id.

16.

SORNARAJAH, supra note 1, at 5. See generally Dominic N. Dagbanja,
Africa, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
226, 336–362 (2019).

17.

See generally Investment Agreement for the COMESA Common
Investment
Area,
May
23,
2007,
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African Investment Code (“PAIC”) is the anchor through which
African states codified their interests in IIAs. 18 However, the PAIC is a
model agreement with no binging effect. 19 Makane Moïse Mbengue and
Stephan Schill dub the innovative developments in the PAIC and other
IIAs as the Africanization of IIL. 20 The developments, Mbengue argues,
make Africa “…an interesting laboratory for the rethinking and
reshaping of international investment law.” 21
In this article, I draw on Third World Approaches to International
Law (“TWAIL”) to critically analyze the extant conceptualization of
Africanization and its association with IIL. The article probes the
conceptualization of “Africanization” of IIL by situating it in the
broader critiques and analysis of IIL regime in the Global South. 22 In
particular, I immerse the Africanization thesis in the critique, reform,
and remaking agenda of TWAIL. 23 This analysis will deepen our
understanding of the contours and blind spots of the Africanization
thesis while setting a path for its normative radical calibration. 24

https://www.iisd.org/toolkits/sustainability-toolkit-for-tradenegotiators/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/rei120.06tt1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SXY3-7RYT].
18.

See Econ. Comm’n for Afr. Comm. of Experts, Draft Pan-African
Investment Code, U.N. Doc. E/ECA/COE/35/18 (Mar. 26, 2016).

19.

Id.

20.

Makane Moïse Mbengue, Special Issue: Africa and the Reform of the
International Investment Regime, 18 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 371, 376
(2017).

21.

Id.

22.

See generally Antonius R Hippolyte, Aspiring for a Constructive TWAIL
Approach Towards the Foreign Investment Regime, in FOREIGN
INVESTMENT LAW and DEVELOPMENT: BRIDGING THE GAP 180
(Stephan W. Schill, Christian J. Tams & Rainer Hofmann eds., 2015).

23.

Gathii, supra note 11, at 255; Upendra Baxi, Some Newly Emergent
Geographies of Injustice: Boundaries and Borders in International Law,
23 IND. J. GLOB. LEGAL STUD. 15, 24 (2016).

24.

To be sure, the aim of this article is neither to revisit questions of the
evolution or contribution of Africa to the development of international
investment law; questions around the substantive provisions of
international investment agreements and the debates around regulatory
autonomy; queries and contestations in global and regional reforms of
international investment law; nor the value of regionalization vis-à-vis the
global IIL regime. See generally Olabisi D. Akinkugbe, Reverse
Contributors? African State Parties, ICSID and the Development of
International Investment Law, 34 ICSID REV. (2019).
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II. Moderate vs Radical Africanization of IIL
The Africanization of IIL is about the progressive reform and
remaking of the IIL regime. 25 At its core, Africanization of IIL
encapsulates substantive and procedural reforms of the IIL regime. 26 It
is about giving voice and ownership to the legislative and treaty reforms
that center the interests of African states. 27 African states’ effort at
reforming and remaking IIL span across regional, sub-regional, and
national spheres, as well as IIAs or bilateral investment treaties
(“BITs”) between African states. 28 This article makes explicit the value
and inherent contradictions that animate the “Africanization” thesis in
IIL.
I characterize the Africanization of IIL into two: moderate and
radical. Moderate Africanization of IIL consists of modest, incremental,
or piecemeal reform of IIL. While useful, the approach does not alter
the fundamental unequal architecture of IIL. 29 In other words, while
useful, moderate Africanization of IIL keeps African states intensely
enveloped in the neoliberal paradigm that underpins the IIL regime.
The reformulation of Africanization principles in response to critiques
sustains the market’s fundamental visions of foreign investment law.30
A half-hearted reform agenda that leaves the core of IIL intact does
little to substantively restructure the subordinate position of African
states. While progressive, a moderate response to the asymmetry of the
IIL regime engenders more challenges for African states. A moderate
form of Africanization reifies and entrenches the core tenets of the
received system. However, moderate Africanization has been successful
in its agenda for reform. For example, the innovative provisions that
distinguish them are becoming a norm in intra-African BITs and IIAs.31
But, the agenda of moderate Africanization has been limited in SouthSouth and North-South treaties. 32 There is no evidence yet that the
incremental reforms that are codified in the IIAs between African states

25.

Id.

26.

Id.

27.

Id.

28.

Id.

29.

Id.

30.

See generally Sornarajah Muthucumaraswamy, Mutations of NeoLiberalism in International Investment Law, 3 TRADE L. & DEV. 203,
205 (2011).

31.

See generally Wolfgang Alschner & Dmitriy Skougarevskiy, Rule-Takers
or Rule-Makers? A New Look at African Bilateral Investment Treaty
Practice (NCCR Trade Regul., Working Paper No. 7, 2016).

32.

Id. at 1.
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have been transplanted beyond the continent. 33 The moderate
Africanization of IIL is caught in a conundrum. The conundrum is
exacerbated by the asymmetry and vulnerable status of African states.
Yet, one should be cautious to dismiss their influence on on-going
reforms such as the lengthy United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”) reform process. 34
Radical Africanization of IIL involves reform agenda where the
regime is less substantively captured by Western or transnational
capital interests. 35 It acknowledges that IIAs have enhanced imperial
domination and exploitation of host states through the mobilization of
treaties, which privileges the usurpation of economic resources in the
Third World. 36 A reform of IIL would be radical if it curtails the spread
of Western imperialism and the overreach of foreign investors that has
constrained the space legislative autonomy in host states. A robust
pursuit of an agenda for the radical Africanization of IIL would bring
about a new international economic order that incorporates the
interests of Africa and the Global South on their own terms.
Radical Africanization of IIL is ambitious, and its aim extends
beyond the geographical boundaries of Africa to other peripheries. It is
a revolutionary project that fundamentally requires the remaking of the
international economic order that has sustained the subordinating
relations between investors and host states. 37 The task of radical
Africanization then strikes at the heart of the unequal integration of
the international economic order. In my view, escalating from a modest
approach to a radical vision of Africanization that challenges the
contemporary international economic and investment order would be
ideal for the changes that African states seek. This is a normative call
33.

Id. (analyzing the question: to what extent have African countries played
an active role in the making and shaping of their bilateral investment
treaties?). The authors empirically track which African states spur
innovation while others do not both in the context of South-South and
intra-African negotiations, id.

34.

Although I do not analyze this point in this article, the need to continue
with this reform agenda from below can be justified on the basis of norm
cascading that may occur over time. See Martha Finnemore & Kathryn
Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, 54 INT’L
ORG., 887, 895 (1998).

35.

For a movement to be transformative, it “must take advantage of the
highly segmented character of social life — its fragmentation into
hierarchically ordered citadels of prerogative — in order to experiment
with forms of social life capable of overcoming the very oppositions —
between right holding and empowerment or between the quality of grand
politics and the reality of practical social experience — that this
segmentation helps strengthen.” Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The Critical
Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 561, 672 (1983).

36.

Id.

37.

GETACHEW, supra note 3, at 17.
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for a more radical Africanization of IIL. However, the inherent
drawbacks of the moderate Africanization of IIL should not deter
African states from moving forward with the reforms. 38 African states
should continue to seek opportunities to cascade these changes, even in
incremental steps, as the opportunities arise.

III. Africanization of International Investment Law
Africanization of IIL is a form of post-colonial African international
legal knowledge production. 39 I appropriate the concept to describe a
legal process or legal phenomena that resists the established oppressive
order of post-colonial continuities of international legal knowledge
production. 40 As a legal process, Africanization is not an end in itself, a
closed set of goals, or a policy prescription. Conceptually, Africanization
of IIL is an evolving critical legal phenomenon with both procedural
and substantive reform agendas. 41 The concept encapsulates holistic,
incremental, or piecemeal reforms designed to reorder the subordination
and trappings of traditional IIAs and the ISDS regime.
Africanization of IIL refers to the substantive and procedural
actions by African states against the hegemony of an international
38.

See Nyanje John, Hegemony in Invest State Dispute Settlement: How
African States Need to Approach Reforms, AFRONOMICSLAW (Sept. 7,
2020),
https://www.afronomicslaw.org/2020/09/07/hegemony-ininvestor-state-dispute-settlement-how-african-states-need-to-approachreforms/ [https://perma.cc/S2A5-EF4M] for a provocative debate of the
plight of the African states in the context of the ISDS reforms; Harrison
Mbori, Exit is the Only Way Out: A Polemic Response to John Nyanje’s
“Hegemony in Investor State Dispute Settlement: How African States need
to Approach Reforms”, AFRONOMICSLAW (Sept. 10, 2020),
https://www.afronomicslaw.org/2020/09/10/exit-is-the-only-way-out-apolemic-response-to-john-nyanjes-hegemony-in-investor-state-disputesettlement-how-african-states-need-to-approach-reforms
[https://perma.cc/36JT-KR2J] (arguing that while procedural reforms
are important, substantive and radical reform of IIL should be
foregrounded, failing which African States should exit the scene).

39.

Akinkugbe, supra note 24.

40.

J.T. Gathii, The Promise of International Law: A Third World View
(Aug.
29,
2020),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3635509
[https://perma.cc/X9HJ-P862] (challenging the limited geography of
places and ideas that dominate international law and arguing that the
Third world is an epistemic site of production and not merely a site of
reception of international legal knowledge while making a compelling case
for ending the insularity of international law which is characterized by a
limited set of locales and ideas); see also Ohio Omiunu, City Reports on
International
Law:
Lagos
in
Focus
(Sept.
7,
2020),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3688493
[https://perma.cc/WZN8-YG73].

41.

See generally Akinkugbe, supra note 24.
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investment regime that historically subjugated their economic
development interests in favor of the investor. 42 Africanization centers
African interests in contrast to and as distinct from their Western and
other Global South counterparts in IIL. 43 Africanization of IIL decries
and responds with substantive reforms to the knowledge, power, and
information asymmetry in foreign investment law. 44
Africanization of IIL should not be equated to the regionalization
of the regime. Rather, it situates the broader socioeconomic, political,
cultural, and sustainable development aspirations of African states with
the interests of investors who enrich themselves even at the expense of
the host states and their peoples. 45 Africanization challenges the
disruptive and exploitative impact of ISDS and IIL regimes. 46 The
Africanization concept that I advance acknowledges that the task of
centering African interests in IIL, “is a dialectical project of engaging
and overcoming untoward dimensions associated with [the African
interests] while simultaneously seeking to extend, deepen, transform
and democratize it as well as the structural and institutional
environment within which it operates both on the national and
international scene.” 47
The Africanization of IIL is also an ongoing ideological struggle.
This ideological struggle is part of a long history of colonial and postcolonial economic domination, inequalities in transnational legal
ordering, and capital power of investors and multinational corporations.
48
As Getachew argues, “relations of economic dependence and
42.

Id.

43.

GETACHEW, supra note 3, at 31–33.

44.

Id.

45.

See Anghie, supra note 10.

46.

See generally Akinkugbe, supra note 24.

47.

James T. Gathii, Representations of Africa in Good Governance
Discourse: Policing and Containing Dissidence to Neo-Liberalism, 18
THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUD. 65, 72 (1998–1999).

48.

In calling for a “postcolonial cosmopolitanism” in response, Getachew
argues that: “[t]he persistence of unequal integration and hierarchy calls
for a postcolonial cosmopolitanism that recenters the problem of empire.
Drawing on the critique of international hierarchy and the anticolonial
efforts to build a world after empire, which are reconstructed in the
following pages, this model of cosmopolitanism is less aimed at the limits
of the nation-state and more concerned with the ways that relations of
hierarchy continue to create differentiated modes of sovereignty and
reproduce domination in the international sphere. As described above,
hierarchy designates not hegemony, but processes of integration and
interaction that produce unevenly distributed rights, obligations, and
burdens. These processes of unequal integration are structural and
embedded in the institutional arrangements of the international order.
They create the international conditions of ongoing imperial domination.”
GETACHEW, supra note 3, at 32–33.
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inequality are often coupled with legal and political modes of unequal
membership in international society.” 49 The difficult task that African
states confront is to devise strategies that “wage ideological and
political struggle while minimizing the costs of engaging in an
inherently legitimating discourse” of IIL. 50 The ideological foundations
of IIL are important and need to be addressed in re-ordering the
investment regime and economic exploitation of host states by
investors. Africanization and the legal reform that it undertakes
broadly decries the violence of IIL and its technologies of governance
on the economic, environmental, and sustainable development rights of
African host states. 51 However, ostensibly bold legal reforms may mask
and legitimize continuing inequality and subordination. Legal reform
alone “cannot serve as a means for fundamentally restructuring”
international economic relations. 52
To the extent that it engages in reforming and remaking IIL,
Africanization reflects a strand of the critical agenda of TWAIL.
TWAIL scholarship relies on a combination of both mainstream and
critical analysis to expose the ways in which international regime
obscure the socio-political and economic interests of developing
countries. 53 Further, to the extent that a core goal of TWAIL is a
“commitment to reforming and remaking international [investment]
law,” 54 I contend that the Africanization of IIL is an example of
substantive TWAIL response to the critique of IIL. This argument is
reinforced by the fact that TWAIL is:
[M]ore than merely a deconstructive and oppositional movement
or network of scholars, but rather one that sees the potential of
reforming if not remaking international law for the greater good
. . . . TWAIL scholarship recognizes that international legal rules
can be simultaneously repressive and liberatory. In other words,
49.

Id. at 32.

50.

See Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment:
Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV.
L. REV. 1331, 1387 (1988).

51.

See generally Oladapo Fabusuyi, Africanisation of International
Investment Law: Prospects and Challenges, AFRONOMICSLAW (Oct. 18,
2019),
https://www.afronomicslaw.org/2019/10/18/africanisation-ofinternational-investment-law-prospects-and-challenges
[https://perma.cc/2GAB-2EZG].

52.

Crenshaw, supra note 50, at 1350.

53.

James T. Gathii, War’s Legacy in International Investment Law, 11 INT’L
COMM. L. REV. 353, 363 (2009); see also ANTONY ANGHIE,
IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 196, 225–44 (2005).

54.

James T. Gathii, The Agenda of Third World Approaches to International
Law (TWAIL), in INTERNATIONAL LEGAL THEORY: FOUNDATIONS AND
FRONTIERS 12 (Jeffery Dunoff & Mark Pollack, eds., 2019).
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TWAIL scholars recognize that international law is not always
an instrument of colonial or post-colonial opposition, it can under
certain circumstances be an instrument for or a site of liberation.55

Thus reimagined, my re-conceptualization of Africanization
channels TWAIL’s regime bias critique of IIL. 56 Regime bias seeks to
understand and appreciate “how specific legal rules . . . shape the
relationship between international capital and Third World states, as
well as the institutional nexus between economies, politics, and
identity.” 57 In recognition of the shortcomings of the legal rules of IIA
for the development of African economies, Africanization seeks a reform
of the system by centering the critical voices of African states in the
IIAs where they have negotiation leverage. The Africanization process
reimagines and reshapes the international investment regime, while
acknowledging the constraints of the IIL regime.
However, as currently practiced, Africanization of IIL is at best a
moderate approach to the reform of the IIL. 58 It is a modest agenda at
rewriting the continent’s contemporary experiences into the IIA
architecture. The normative call that this article makes is for a bold
move towards the radical. In its radical form, Africanization of IIL does
not legitimize the hegemony of traditional IIL regime. Radical
Africanization does not reify Eurocentric underpinnings of IIL.
In the next section of this article, I examine the regional substantive
reforms in IIL. I focus on the innovative aspects of the PAIC model
agreement that are illustrative of Africanization of IIL. Essentially, my
point is a simple one: the regional reforms in Africa are a moderate
response to the international investment system; they are akin to
window-dressing and therefore do not go far enough to alter the
foundational rules of IIL.

55.

Id. at 29–30.

56.

Gathii, Third World Approaches to International Economic Governance,
supra note 11, at 261–62 (“the Regime Bias approach emphasizes that
adverse outcome for Third world countries and poor communities within
developed economies are not inevitable, and as such that such outcomes
are not always traceable to a commitment to free market rules or norms.
Rather, bias is traced in the way in which rules of international trade,
commerce and investment are crafted, applied, and adjudicated between
Third world and developed countries or between Third World countries
and the interests of international capital.”)

57.

Id. at 265.

58.

See generally Ibironke T. Odumosu-Ayanu, South-South Investment
Treaties, Transnational Capital and African Peoples, 21 AFR. J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 172 (2013).
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IV. Substantive Aspects of Africanization of IIL:
Innovative, but Modest Reforms
Modern African IIAs differ substantively from the traditional model
of IIAs. 59 Modern IIAs incorporate rules that are relevant to the
economic and sustainable development of developing countries. 60 They
are deemed progressive, unlike traditional IIAs that maintain the
structure of domination by investors. 61 African states have expressed
their dissatisfaction with traditional IIAs at both the national and
regional levels. 62
I do not envision the ongoing reforms of IIL in Africa under the
rubric of regionalism of IIL alone. In my view, such an approach
inherently limits the innovative character of some of the investment
reforms in Africa. It also, perhaps inadvertently, erases the African
voice in the reform agenda of IIAs and IIL. 63 To account for their views
in the IIA regime, reforms undertaken by African states at the national,
sub-regional, and regional (or continental) levels have introduced
innovative provisions in either intra-African BITs or regional
investment protocols and model agreements. 64
First, at the national level, African states adopted investment laws
to regulate investment within the country; the 2015 South Africa
Protection of Investment Act (“Act”), which came into effect on July
13, 2018, provides a significantly limited protection of foreign

59.

See generally Konrad von Moltke & Howard Mann, Towards A Southern
Agenda on International Investment: Discussion Paper on the Role of
International Investment Agreements, INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE
DEV. (2004).

60.

See generally id.

61.

See James T. Gathii, Representations of Africa in Good Governance
Discourse: Policing and Containing Dissidence to Neo-Liberalism, 18
THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUD. 65, 70 (1998–1999) (discussing idea of
progress in investment sphere among Africans).

62.

See Olwor Sunday Nicholas, International Law and Legal Regimes of
Foreign Direct Investment in Selected African Countries (Oct. 1, 2020)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with Social Science Research Network).

63.

In this regard, I agree with Stephan Schill that unlike in other regions,
regionalism of African international investment law “is less an expression
of fragmentation or the result of conflicting internal or external interests
pulling in different directions, but a constructive step in
defragmentation.” Stephan W. Schill, Editorial: The New (African)
Regionalism in International Investment Law, 18 J. WORLD INV. &
TRADE, 367, 368 (2017).

64.

MAKANE MOÏSE MBENGUE & STEFANIE SCHACHERER, EVOLUTION OF
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS IN AFRICA: FEATURES AND
CHALLENGES OF INVESTMENT LAW “AFRICANIZATION” HANDBOOK
INT’L INV. L. & POL’Y, 2 (2019).
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investment. 65 The Act grants the South African government the right
to take regulatory measures to redress historical, social, and economic
inequalities and injustice, foster economic development, protect the
environment, uphold the rights, values, and principles of the
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, and achieve the
progressive realization of socio-economic rights. 66 Historically, the
South African government was more open to the conclusion of BITs. 67
However, the inequities that the BITs enhanced have led to their
termination or deliberate lapse by the South African government. 68 The
Act thus fills an important void in investment regulation. However,
commentators argue that the legislation significantly waters down the
protection foreign investors enjoy in South Africa. 69 For example, a
contentious aspect of the legislation stripped away the ability of foreign
investors to challenge South Africa before an international tribunal.70
In particular, the legislation makes consent to international arbitration
subject to the exhaustion of domestic remedies. 71 Hence, unlike
investment treaties, which prescribe compulsory investor-state
international arbitration outside of South Africa before an international
65.

See Protection of Investment Act, Act No. 22 of 2015, Official Gazette,
Vol. 606, No. 39514, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/investmentlaws/laws/157/south-africa-investment-act
[https://perma.cc/872HXSF2]; see generally Malebakeng Agnes Forere, The New South African
Protection of Investment Act, in RECONCEPTUALIZING INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW FROM THE GLOBAL SOUTH 251, 265 (Fabio Morosini
& Michelle Ratton Sanchez Badin eds., 2018); Tarcisio Gazzini, Travelling
the National Route: South Africa’s Protection of Investment Act 2015, 26
AFR. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 242, 242–43 (2018).

66.

Gazzini, supra note 65, at 8, 10.

67.

See generally Dennis M. Davis, Bilateral Investment Treaties: Has South
Africa Chartered a New Course, 2018 ACTA JURIDICA 1, 2 (2018).

68.

Id. at 2–4.

69.

See Phillip de Wet, Ramaphosa Just Activated a Law That Scare Foreign
Investors – And Makes it Harder for Them to Fight Expropriation,
INSIDER
SOUTH
AFRICA
(July
13,
2018),
BUSINESS
https://www.businessinsider.co.za/protection-of-investment-actcommencement-gazetted-foreign-mediation-bee-section-25-constitution2018-7 [https://perma.cc/2WJA-32SV].

70.

Id.

71.

See Protection of Investment Act, Act No. 22 of 2015, Official Gazette,
Vol.
606,
No.
39514,
at
¶
13(5),
https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/investment-laws/laws/157/southafrica-investment-act [https://perma.cc/872H-XSF2] (“[t]he government
may consent to international arbitration in respect of investments covered
by this Act, subject to the exhaustion of domestic remedies. The
consideration of a request for international arbitration will be subject to
the administrative processes set out in section 6. Such arbitration will be
conducted between the Republic and the home state of the applicable
investor.”).
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tribunal, the legislation contains no compulsory referral to international
arbitration at all. 72 Although many see the legislation as unsupportive
of investors, 73 I argue that the measure was necessitated by the historic
inequities of BITs. Hence, it is a response to the challenges of the IIL
regime as opposed to a deliberate attempt to turn the country’s back
on investments.
Second, there have been various BITs concluded between African
countries and other non-African countries; the 2016 Morocco-Nigerian
BIT, which contains several innovative provisions, is a classic example
of this development. 74 This new breed of BIT incorporates provisions
that rebalance the interests of contracting states and the investors. 75
Notably, the Morocco-Nigerian BIT includes provisions that: (1)
safeguard states discretion in enacting regulation and imposing
obligations on investors; (2) contribute investment to the host state’s
sustainable development; and (3) set out an innovative pre-arbitration
procedure for preventing and resolving disputes — e.g. the Joint
Committee on the settlement of disputes. 76 While the Joint Committee
and associated “dispute prevention” mechanism are relatively novel
elements in the context of BITs, the peaceful settlement of disputes is
an enduring feature of the regional trade agreements in Africa. 77 As
such, its incorporation in the BITs is an indication of the spread of
norms generated by African states in international economic and
investment relations. The Morocco-Nigeria BIT thus illustrates the
72.

Philip de Wet, supra note 69.

73.

See id.

74.

See Reciprocal Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement Between
the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco and the Government of the
Federal Republic of Nigeria, Morocco-Nigeria, Dec. 3, 2016,
https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investmentagreements/treaty-files/5409/download [https://perma.cc/PS3Y-VK6G]
[hereinafter Reciprocal Investment Promotion and Protection
Agreement]; see also Okechukwu Ejims, The 2016 Morocco-Nigeria
Bilateral Investment Treaty: More Practical Reality in Providing a
Balanced Investment Treaty?, 34 ICSID REV. 62, 62–84 (2019). Barnali
Choudhury, International Investment Law and Noneconomic Issues, 53
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 10 (2020). In comparison, the NigeriaSingapore BIT includes more extensive provisions on health and safety,
the environment and corporate social responsibility than traditional BITs.
However, they do not have direct obligations on the investor in the same
way as in the BIT.

75.

See Reciprocal Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement, supra
note 74, at art. 15 (recognizing it is inappropriate to encourage investment
by certain means).

76.

Id. at arts. 23, 24, 26.

77.

Tiyanjana Maluwa, The Peaceful Settlement of Dispute Among African
States, 1963–1983: Some Conceptual Issues and Practical Trends, 38
INT’L & COMP L. Q. 299, 306 (1989).
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growing density of African IIL reforms aimed at centering the interests
of the host states.
Third, there are sub-regional investment rules and model treaties
or protocols that regional economic communities in Africa have adopted
or planned to use to regulate their sub-region. 78 I will highlight four of
these developments. First, the adoption of the Supplementary Act on
Common Investment Rules for the Economic Community of West
African States in 2008 (“Supplementary Act”) 79 aims to promote
investment that supports sustainable development of the Economic
Community of West African States (“ECOWAS”) sub-region. 80 It
“applies to all investments by an investor, whether the investment is
made before or after the entry into force of [the] Supplementary Act.”81
There are overlaps between the Supplementary Act and the MoroccoNigerian BIT; for example, the Supplementary Act prevents direct
access to international arbitration for investors thereby limiting the
traditional investment protections. 82 This synergy bodes well for the
spread of norms generated by the new intra-African BITS. Second, the
adoption of the Model Bilateral Investment Treaty by the Southern
African Development Community (“SADC Model BIT”) in 2012. 83 The
SADC Model BIT stated that investments must enhance the
sustainable development of the host country. 84 The SADC Model BIT
was not intended to be, and is not, a legally binding document.85
Instead, it offers a template for governments in their future negotiations
of investment treaties. 86 It suggests that a “fair administrative
78.

See generally Talkmore Chidede, The Right to Regulate in Africa’s
International Investment law Regime, 20 OR. R. INT’L L. 437, 449–50
(2019) (examining the contemporary international investment law
framework in Africa with a view to determining whether such framework
preserves host states’ right to regulate investment in public interest).

79.

See Supplementary Act A/SA.3/12/08 Adopting Community Rules on
Investment and the Modalities for their implementation with ECOWAS,
December 19, 2008, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/internationalinvestment-agreements/treaty-files/3266/download
[https://perma.cc/522Y-68XP].

80.

See Ernest Amoabeng Ortsin, The ECOWAS Common Investment
Market Vision: A Conceptual Preview, in FINANCING AFRICA’S
DEVELOPMENT: PATHS TO SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIC GROWTH 221,
221–22 (Diery Seck ed., 2020).

81.

Supplementary Act, supra note 79, at art. 4(1).

82.

Id. at art. 18(1).

83.

See generally SADC MODEL BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY
TEMPLATE WITH COMMENTARY, SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT
COMMUNITY (2012).

84.

Id.

85.

Id.

86.

Id.
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treatment” should replace the fair and equitable standard in traditional
IIAs. 87 Third, the adoption of the Common Market for Eastern and
Southern Africa (“COMESA”) and Common Investment Area
(“CCIA”) in 2007. 88 The CCIA agreement is a promotional tool meant
to guide Member States of COMESA by harmonizing best investment
practices and facilitating private sector development. 89 Although it has
not been ratified by any of the Member States, plans are afoot to ensure
that the CCIA gains traction. 90 The revised CCIA, which aligns the
agreement with trends in IIL and specific standards regarding investor
protection, was adopted by the Council of Ministers of COMESA in
2017. 91 According to COMESA, “the revised CCIA is aligned to the
Pan African Investment Code championed by the African Union. This
Framework will provide a platform for the investment chapter that is
the integral part of the Continental Free Trade Area (“ACFTA”).” 92
Fourth, on a regional level, the PAIC Model Agreement, which
critically appraised traditional IIAs and provided suggestions, informs
future negotiations of investment treaties. 93 The PAIC Model
Agreement contains provisions aimed at limiting the standards for the
protection of investments, requiring investments to foster sustainable
development and creating new obligations such as human rights, due
diligence, and the sustainable use of natural resources for investors.94
87.

See Sonia E. Rolland & David M. Trubek, Legal Innovation in Investment
Law: Rhetoric and Practice in Emerging Countries, 39 U. PA. J. INT’L
L. 358, 405 (2017).

88.

See The Investment Agreement for the COMESA Common Investment
Area, May 23, 2007, https://www.iisd.org/toolkits/sustainability-toolkitfor-trade-negotiators/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/rei120.06tt1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KHY3-FPM2].

89.

Peter Muchlinski, The COMESA Common Investment Area: Substantive
Standards and Procedural Problems in Dispute Settlement, SOAS SCHOOL
OF LAW RESEARCH PAPER SERIES 1, 2 (2008).

90.

See Mwangi Gakunga, Plans Afoot to Publicize Common Investment Area
Agreement, COMESA (Apr. 27, 2020), https://www.comesa.int/plansafoot-to-publicize-common-investment-area-agreement/
[https://perma.cc/2W47-C865].

91.

Id.

92.

Id.

93.

Won Kidane, Contemporary International Investment Law Trends and
Africa’s Dilemmas in the Draft Pan-African Investment Code, 50 GEO.
WASH. INT’L L. REV. 523 (2018) (analyzing in historical context, with
theoretical analogies, the experiences of African States with the
international investment law regime and an evaluation of the PIAC in
light of its purpose and developments in IIL).

94.

Sustainable development is a feature of the third generation of investment
agreements. Akinkugbe, supra note 24, 450. (“The third generation of
investment disputes involving African States starts from 2010 and runs
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The PAIC Model Agreement provides the basis for the negotiation of
the ACFTA Investment Protocol. 95 The areas of innovative drafting in
the PAIC include: (1) the definition of investment and investor; (2)
rejection of pre-establishment commitment; (3) the clarifications of
“like circumstances” as well as exceptions to national treatment under
the MFN and National Treatment clauses; (4) the absence of a
provision on fair and equitable treatment; (5) exceptions to the transfer
of funds; and (6) performance requirements. 96 The PAIC’s preamble
incorporates provisions important for the agreement’s interpretation.97
Specifically, the preamble affirms the need to “promote corruption free
investment and trade regime and improved laws and regulations that
promote transparency and accountability in governance.”98
Additionally, the investment must meet the full Salini et al. v. Morocco
test and should have a significant contribution to the host State’s

to the present moment. Like those of previous generations, thirdgeneration disputes represent a significant and radical extension of the
frontiers of issues in ICSID investment dispute jurisprudence. This
category of investment disputes interestingly incorporates new themes
such as sustainable development, human rights, protection of indigenous
rights and environmental standards—to mention a few—in the broader
discourse on international investment.”). The African Society of
International Law (AFSIL) Principles on international investment for
Sustainable Development in Africa offer a series of guiding principles that
elaborate on sustainable development goals in IIA in Africa. The AFSIL
Principles “constitute an emancipatory form of contestation, whereby the
application of the rules of international investment law is tailored to serve
political projects valued highly by the ASIL while falling short of the
ambition to revamp the universal investment protection regime.” Alicia
Köppen & Jean d’Aspremont, Global Reform vs Regional Emancipation:
The Principles on International Investment for Sustainable Development
in Africa, ESIL REFLECTIONS (Feb. 27, 2017), https://esil-sedi.eu/esilreflection-global-reform-vs-regional-emancipation-the-principles-oninternational-investment-for-sustainable-development-in-africa-2/
[https://perma.cc/JD7M-CH3G].
95.

See generally MAX MENDEZ-PARRA, ED, AFCFTA INVESTMENT
NEGOTIATIONS:
NOTES
ON
CONCEPTS
(May
2020),
https://set.odi.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Investment-TrainingNotes.pdf [https://perma.cc/6VJQ-CDA6]; Hamed El-Kady, The New
Landmark African Investment Protocol: A Quantum Leap or African
Investment Policy Making?, KLUWER ARB. BLOG (Sept. 24, 2020),
http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2020/09/24/the-newlandmark-african-investment-protocol-a-quantum-leap-for-africaninvestment-policy-making/ [https://perma.cc/P284-ZE8L] (arguing that
the AFCFTA Investment Protocol could result in a “quantum leap” for
Africa).

96.

See Econ. Comm’n for Af. Comm. of Experts, Draft Pan-African
Investment Code, U.N. Doc. E/ECA/COE/35/18 (Mar. 26, 2016).

97.

Id.

98.

Id.
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economic development. 99 This extension reaffirms the economic
developmental model that underpins the design of IIAs in Africa. 100 In
this regard, Mbengue and Schacherer declare,
The PAIC is . . . an African tuning or recalibration of
[International Investment Agreements - IIAs]. It reflects the
development that new IIAs are no longer based on either the
North American or European models, but that other regions also
engage in shaping IIAs according to their level of economic
development and social needs. . . . [It] . . . endows Africa with a
voice in the international debate on the future and reform of the
international investment regime. 101

In the context of the PAIC, Mbengue and Schacherer anchor the
Africanization thesis by focusing on issues relating to developing and
least-developed African countries, balancing the interests and rights of
investors and host states alike, and incorporating sustainable
development goals. 102 The influential potential of the PAIC model
agreement, especially in the course of the negotiation of the ACFTA
Investment Protocol, should not be underestimated. Mouhamadou
Madana Kane notes that “the Code can serve as a useful capacity-

building instrument. It can, indeed, provide guidance to the
negotiators of these agreements, in support of the continent’s

99.

Salini Costruttori S.P.A. v. Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID Case No.
ARB/00/4, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 52 (July 23, 2001).

100. Dagbanja, supra note 16, at 362 (“The requirement in the PAIC that to
qualify as an investment, the investment must make a contribution to the
development of the host state is equally consistent with the development
imperative that informs the making of IIAs.”). See also Dominic
Npoanlari Dagbanja, The Development Objective as an Imperative in
Interpretation of International Investment Agreements, 44 U. OF W.
AUSTL. L. REV.
144, 145 (2019); See generally Dominic Napoanlari Dagbanja, The Paradox of
International Investment Law: Trivializing the Development Objective
Underlying International Investment Agreements in Investor-State
Dispute Settlement, in MODERNIZING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW TO
SUPPORT
INNOVATION
AND
SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT:
PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION
ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, 258–273 (2017).
101. Makane Moise Mbengue & Stefanie Schacherer, The ‘Africanization of
International Investment Law: The Pan-African Investment Code and the
Reform of the International Investment Regime, 18 J. WORLD INV. &
TRADE 414, 447–48 (2017).
102. See Makane Moise Mbengue & Stefanie Schacherer, Africa and the
Rethinking of International Investment Law: About the Elaboration of the
Pan-African Investment Code, in COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL LAW
547, 559 (Anthea Roberts et al., eds., 2018) for the authors’ explanation
of the PAIC’s balanced approach.
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structural transformation objectives.” 103 I will go further, and
hope that African negotiators will heed the call by many
academics to be more radical in their drafting of the investment
protocol. This calls on negotiators to not only adopt some of the
finest aspects of the PAIC Model Agreement, but to build on it
in ways that harness the interests of African states and challenge
the systemic inequities in IIL.

Premised on the foregoing substantive innovations at the national,
sub-regional, and regional levels, Mbengue and Schacherer state, “the
PAIC, the revised SADC Model Treaty, the new COMESA investment
agreement, and the ECOWIC all consolidate a trend of ‘Africanization’
of IIL in the current context of reform of the international investment
regime.” 104 At different times, the scholars describe African states
variously as international investment rule “makers” or “producers,” as
opposed to rule “takers” or “consumers.” 105 The move by African states
to “adapt the investment law game to their context, priorities and
realities . . . show a new vision of Africa: that of a pioneer in setting
innovative standard for the reform of the international investment

103. See Mouhamadou Madana Kane, The Pan-African Investment Code: A
Good First Step, but More is Needed, 217 COLUM. FDI PERSPECTIVES
1, 2 (2018) (contending that in view of the non-bindingness of the PAIC,
it should be renamed “Pan-African Guiding Principles on Investor-State
Relations”)
104. See Makane Moise Mbengue & Stephanie Schacherer, Evolution of
International Investment Agreements in Africa: Features and Challenges
of Investment Law “Africanization,” in HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW AND POLICY, 1–23 (Julien Chaisse et al., eds., 2019);
see also Makane Moise Mbengue, The Quest for a Pan-African Investment
Code to Promote Sustainable Development, ICTSD: BRIDGES AFRICA
(June
21,
2016),
https://ictsd.iisd.org/bridges-news/bridgesafrica/news/the-quest-for-a-pan-african-investment-code-to-promotesustainable [https://perma.cc/7QPF-QFG6].
105. See generally Mbengue & Schacherer, supra note 104 (undertaking a
comparative law analysis to understand how African interests shape
different approaches to international investment law and to see how the
PAIC challenges traditional core approaches.); see also Mbengue &
Schacherer, supra note 104; Makane Moïse Mbengue, Special Issue: Africa
and the Reform of the International Investment Regime, 18 J. WORLD
INVEST. TRADE 371, 371–78 (2017); Athina Fouchard Papaefstratiou,
Capucine du Pac de Marsoulies, Martic Tavaut & Clemet Fouchard, The
Africanisation of Rule-Making in International Investment Arbitration,
ARBITRATION
BLOG,
(Aug.
17,
2018),
KLUWER
http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2018/08/17/africanisationrule-making-international-investment-arbitration/
[https://perma.cc/6CK8-KE5K] (noting that African countries, “adapt
international investment rules to their context, needs and realities and at
the same time as pioneers in standard-setting activity in international
investment protection.”).
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law.” 106 The innovative provisions of the PAIC on investment “are most
appropriate and should be adopted not only in intra-African IIAs but
also in IIAs involving African countries and non-African countries.” 107
Mbengue and Schacherer argue further that contemporary African
states are “investment rules providers” as opposed to “investment rules
consumers.” 108 On the one hand, African states were investment rule
consumers partly because of the “asymmetry in terms of economic
development between African host countries and investors’ home
countries.” 109 On the other hand, they are investment rule providers
because of the “adoption of modern investment agreements that apply
in their respective region.” 110 Reinforcing this position, Hamed El-Kady
and Mustaqeem De Gama argue that African states and their regional
economic communities are no longer just rule takers, they are
“investment treaty makers” and are adopting investment policies that
reflect their own terms and preferences as opposed to rubber stamping
transplanted models. 111
Mbengue and Schacherer’s latest iteration of Africanization offers
a less optimistic reflection of the Africanization of IIL. The tone sharply
contrasts the optimism of their previous analysis. 112 Although they
continue to acknowledge the uniqueness of the Africanization thesis,
they were concerned that challenges, such as the implementation
hurdles that the reforms will confront, the lack of binding authority of
the PAIC, the stratified investment regulatory regime in Africa, and
the limited geographical spread of the innovative provisions are a huge
drawback on investment reform gains. To the extent that the
innovative reforms in the Africanization of IIL have been mainly
between African states’ IIAs, and have not infiltrated the North-South
IIAs, they offered some concrete suggestions to move the Africanization
of IIL forward in Africa. 113 They acknowledge that the innovative
106. Makane Moise Mbengue, Africa’s Voice in the Formation, Shaping and
Redesign of International Investment Law, 34 ICSID REV. FOREIGN INV.
L. J. 455, 480 (2019) (“By fostering their own approach to the reform of
international investment law aligned with their circumstances and needs,
African countries are effectively ‘africanizing’ the development of
international investment rules and the reform of the ISDS system.”).
107. Dagbanja, supra note 16, at 362.
108. Mbengue & Schacherer, supra note 104, at 567.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Hamed El-Kady & Mustaqeem De Gama, The Reform of the International
Investment Regime: An African Perspective, 34 ICSID REV. FOREIGN
INV. L. J. 482 (2019).
112. Mbengue & Schacherer, supra note 104, at 1 (distinguishing between
extra-and intra African IIAs and presenting the African “spaghetti bowl”
of IIAs in a straightforward manner).
113. See generally id.
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provisions that are gradually characterizing the IIAs are limited to
those concluded between two or more African states or concluded by
the regional economic communities. 114 Essentially, African states have
not been able to translate these bilateral, national, sub-regional and
regional innovative provisions into IIA negotiations with Global North
countries. 115 Africanization of IIAs is therefore “confronted with the fact
that political and economic power continue to structure and define the
outcome of IIA negotiations.” 116 The latest iteration by Mbengue and
Schacherer reveals the limitations of moderate Africanization of IIL.117
I will return to the point in the next section.
From another perspective, in the context of economic relations
among African states, other scholars have used computational measures
of textual similarity to offer an analysis based on empirical evidence on
the question: which African states are rule-takers and rule-makers?118
Their insight affirms the core argument of this article, that
Africanization of IIL has only a moderate and limiting effect on the
systemic challenges of the regime. 119 In this regard, Wolfgang Alschner
and Dmitriy Skougarevskiy distinguish between North-South BITs and
African South-South BITs. 120 On the one hand, in relation to NorthSouth BITs, African states are rule-takers. 121 They have not been able
to translate their innovative provisions meaningfully as part of the
substantive provisions of the IIAs that the North parties negotiate.122
On the other hand, in the context of African South-South BITs, African
states are rule-makers. 123 Even in the context of rule-makers, not all
African states hold the economic and knowledge bargain that spurs
innovation in the negotiation of the BITs. 124 In their analysis, Alschner
114. Id. at 2.
115. See generally id.
116. Id. at 3.
117. See generally Mbengue & Schacherer, supra note 104.
118. See Wolfgang Alschner & Dmitriy Skougarevskiy, Rule-Takers or RuleMakers? A New Look at African Bilateral Investment Treaty Practice, 1
(World Trade Inst. Working Paper No. 7, 2016) (analyzing the question:
to what extent have African countries played an active role in the making
and shaping of their bilateral investment treaties? The authors carefully
track based on empirical analyses which African states spur innovation
while others do not both in the context of South-South and intra-African
negotiations).
119. Id. at 8–9.
120. Id. at 9–10
121. Id. at 8–9.
122. Id. at 6, 13.
123. Id. at 21.
124. Id. at 2.
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and Dmitriy found that “smaller countries such as Mauritius or
Morocco, presumably due to better in-house expertise and a more
coherent investment policy agenda, are more successful in setting the
terms of investment agreements.” 125
To summarize, the novel aspects of African IIAs are a positive step
in reorienting traditionally problematic provisions of IIAs in favor of
African states. 126 In other cases, some of the IIAs also balance the rights
and obligations for investors and host states alike. 127 They constitute a
useful point of departure in the global discussion on IIA and ISDS
reform — as such moderate Africanization of IIL. 128 However, systemic
challenges arising from power imbalance the African IIL regime
remains. 129 The emerging point is that the substantive translation of
the Africanization of IIL in IIAs is a real dilemma for African states. In
the next section, I briefly analyze these blind spots.

V. Blind Spots of Moderate Africanization of
International Investment Law
First, moderate Africanization of IIAs engender contradictions,
reification, and the entrenchment of African states in the very system
they criticize. 130 These contradictions arise from the fact that, although
some changes occur, they are piecemeal and might easily be described
as window-dressing as they occur within the framework that has
constrained and continues to constrain the economic development of
the host states. Mbengue sees opportunity for African states to not only
carry on their reforms on IIAs, but also to build on the universal
acquis. 131 He suggests that:
[w]hen opportune and cost effective, the continent should utilize
the tools that it readily has at its disposal. For instance, when
125. Id. at 21.
126. See generally Mbengue & Schacherer, supra note 104, for a discussion of
the positive progress toward equity between foreign investors and African
states.
127. See generally Alschner & Skougarevskiy, supra note 118, for a review of
how IIAs can balance rights in African investment treaties.
128. Gudrun Zagel, International Investment Agreements (IIAs) and
Sustainable Development: Are the African Reform Approaches a Possible
Way out of the Global IIA Crisis? AFRONOMICSLAW (Oct. 31, 2019),
https://www.afronomicslaw.org/2019/10/31/international-investmentagreements-iias-and-sustainable-development-are-the-african-reformapproaches-a-possible-way-out-of-the-global-iia-crisis/
[https://perma.cc/94RP-SUKQ].
129. Id.
130. See generally Mbengue, supra note 105.
131. Id. at 480.
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negotiating which ISDS mechanism should be included in
AfCFTA Investment Protocol, AU member States could take
advantage of the services offered by ICSID by envisioning the
creation of an ICSID focal point on the continent. 132

In my view, such a recommendation will likely engender a
perpetuation of post-colonial continuities that TWAIL and other
critical scholars have warned against. An ICSID Center in Africa is not
necessarily a problem; the challenge is that such an approach
potentially makes arbitration forums in Africa less attractive. The
foregoing recommendation demonstrates one of the limitations of the
moderate Africanization to reform and remake IIL. The ICSID
arbitration regime has been criticized as part of the broader dispute
settlement architecture in IIL that is unfair to developing countries.133
TWAIL’s regime bias critique queries such bodies as ICSID.134
Reverting to an ICSID focal point in Africa raises more questions than
answers. 135 For example, what will be the fate of many regional
arbitration centers across Africa? Such a moderate Africanization
approach runs into tension with the clamour by African arbitrators or
those of African descent to have equal opportunity for representation
of host state parties. Additionally, it will likely lead to stricter
competition regime for many African law firms. 136 Recently, a “new”
list of arbitrators of African descent was released as part of the process
that is designed to make qualified arbitrators visible. 137 In my view, this
is one version of Africanization that radically challenges the dominance
of Western expertise in the settlement of investment disputes. The list
was compiled “to [make] professionals more visible and accessible to
institutions and law firms seeking individuals of colour to appoint as

132. Id.
133. Id. at 461–62.
134. See generally Gathii, supra note 11 (explaining the TWAIL framework
approach).
135. UNITED NATIONS UNCTAD, THE RISE OF REGIONALISM
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT POLICYMAKING: CONSOLIDATION
COMPLEXITY? (2013).
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136. Ibironke T Odumosu, The Law and Politics of Engaging Resistance in
Investment Dispute Settlement, 26 PENN St. INT’L L. R. 254, 266 (2007);
Jalia Kangave, A TWAIL Analysis of Foreign Investment and
Development-Induced Displacement and Resettlement: Lessons from
Uganda’s Bujagali Hydroelectric Project 44 OTTAWA L. R. 213 (2012).
137. Katherine Simpson & Nancy M. Thevenin, A New List: Arbitrators of
African Descent, AFRICAN ARB. ASS’N (June 17, 2020),
https://afaa.ngo/resources/New%20List%20of%20Arbitrators%20of%20
African%20Descent%20(002).pdf [https://perma.cc/84ZA-A87G].

29

Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 53 (2021)
Africanization and the Reform of International Investment Law

arbitrators, mediators, potential hires, conference speakers, or coauthors.” 138
Second, African international investment law scholars, such as Won
Kidane, contend that African states are merely codifying post-colonial
continuities and the dilemmas they confront. 139 Kidane contends that
since the IIL regime was
made for Africa . . . When Africa . . . attempts to use the
normative universe for ordering intra-Africa relations it faces the
same kinds of dilemmas that it faced in the immediate postcolonial period relative to colonial boundaries, colonial laws, and
institutions. The dilemmas have their own history, and the
history presents its own contemporary dilemmas. The PanAfrican Investment Code [he argues] . . . is nothing but a
codification of these dilemmas. 140

Further, Kidane argues that,
any attempt to resolve the dilemmas of history must thus answer
the perennial question of whether or not the existing doctrines
and institutions could be sufficiently cleansed of their imperial
and colonial DNA to be meaningfully deployed for the ordering
of horizontal relations among those who had endured the
indignities of subordination. 141

As this article contends, the task of reforming and remaking the
IIL regime to address African interests requires a radical Africanization
of IIL. Yet, moderate reforms to remake the system should not be
discarded as irrelevant because moderate Africanization of IIL does not
foreclose ongoing and progressive critique and refinement that centers
African interests. Contemporary IIL is a product of a long history of
domination. African states’ quest to reform the IIL will not happen
with a single major change. In my view, if it occurs, it will be the
outcome of a constellation of moderate Africanization of IIL over a
reasonable period.
Third, the moderate Africanization reform leaves African states
deeply entrenched in the neoliberal trappings of IIL. 142 In other words,
to the extent that the reform only addresses aspects of the problem, as
opposed to a radical overhaul of the regime, African states will remain
constrained by the power dynamics and knowledge and information
138. Funke Adekoya, SAN, A “New” List – Arbitrators of African Descent,
AFRICAN ARB. ASS’N, (June 26, 2020), https://afaa.ngo/page18097/9061705 [https://perma.cc/4BY9-828T].
139. Kidane, supra note 93, at 525–26.
140. Id. at 526.
141. Id. at 537.
142. Chidede, supra note 78, at 439.

30

Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 53 (2021)
Africanization and the Reform of International Investment Law

asymmetry which is in favor of the investors. 143 The hegemony of
neoliberal policy ideas in the field of international investment law is
undeniable. 144 As Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah argues, “neo-liberal
principles will continue to show vitality, particularly because the
dominant transnational class prefers to maintain such vitality by
recasting the old structure in new forms.” 145 Africanization of IIL
innovation occurs within the context of IIAs that remain underpinned
by a neoliberal agenda. 146 Neoliberal policy set for economic and
political freedom are based on stereotypes of failure “lack of political
free will and economic rationality.” 147 Moderate and incremental reform
does not therefore promise the emancipation that African countries seek
by the type of reforms undertaken to date.
Fourth, the innovative characteristics of the moderate
Africanization of IIL are limited to the African — regional, subregional, and national — regulatory space. 148 The fact that the IIAs the
African states negotiated with home state investors have not included
some of the innovative provisions of IIAs in Africa reveal the limitation
of the moderate and incremental approach to the remaking and
reforming of IIL. 149
In the concluding section of this article, I reflect on how the
Africanization of IIL as a normative radical project may cascade its
norms to spread its innovative provisions beyond intra-African IIAs.
While the proposal may be ambitious, it offers a realistic opportunity
for the constellation of moderate reforms into radical Africanization of
IIL over time.

143. See FOLA ADELEKE, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND POLICY IN
AFRICA: EXPLORING A HUMAN RIGHTS BASED APPROACH TO
INVESTMENT REGULATION DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 8 (2018).
144. Id. at 1.
145. Muthucumaraswamy, supra note 30, at 205.
146. See ADELEKE, supra note 143, at 8–9 (discussing the potential legal
consequences of African states’ pursuit of innovation in IIAs).
147. James T. Gathii, Representations of Africa in Good Governance
Discourse: Policing and Containing Dissidence to Neo-Liberalism, 18
THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUD. 65, 71 (1998–1999).
148. See generally Alicia Köppen & Jean d’Aspremont, Global Reform Versus
Regional Emancipation: The Principles on International Investment for
Sustainable Development in Africa, in YENKONG NGANGJOH HODU
MOISE MBENGUE & PARVEEN MORRIS, AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES IN
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 18–29 (2020) (discussing the more
limited approach of regional emancipation as a likelier route to IIL change
than global reform).
149. See ADELEKE, supra note 143.
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VI. Concluding Remarks: Recalibrating the
Geographies of Africanization beyond African IIAs
African states confront an inevitable regime of IIL while seeking
pragmatic legal strategies to re-organize their own interests in a
meaningful way in contrast to those of investors. To truly have the
impact it deserves, the Africanization of IIL must overcome the formal
barriers that co-constitute the subordination host states. Radical
systemic reform of IIL regime with consequential economic and legal
ordering of the relations of international actors would be difficult to
achieve. However, incremental, moderate or mere procedural windowdressing is not a desirable condition for African countries either. As this
article demonstrated, a moderate Africanization of IIL, while useful, is
limiting.
To address this conundrum, I contend that a constellation of
moderate meaningful reforms overtime is more realistic than a single
radical change. To reform and remake the traditional IIA and ISDS
regime, modest achievements along the way must be acknowledged
while we strive for the next “win” against an international investment
regime that pillages on African resources in the name of investment.
From a practical point of view, it would be utopian and naive to
imagine that the IIL system will roll out the red carpet for African
states or the Global South to center their concerns in IIAs. 150 Perhaps
a pessimistic view, but it seems difficult to see that happening today.
Since quitting the IIL system is the least of options available,
African states must continue to seek critical junctures to intervene with
more meaningful substantive reforms — even if moderate — that
remake the international investment regime in a way that centres their
own interests. To truly benefit from such piecemeal approach, there
must be a longer and more normative radical strategy to the reforms.
One way to engineer such a radical normative reform is to ensure
solidarity in other Global South countries. Ensuring that the IIAs
concluded between Global South countries reflect these innovative
provisions will push the boundaries of sustainable development,
environmental protection, national policy space protection, and
responsible economic investment. As Stephan Schill notes, the specific
features of African regionalism in investment governance already
developed “can also serve as a useful example for how regional
integration in investment law and policy can lead to consolidation and
ensure legitimacy in investment governance elsewhere. If other regions
were to follow the African example, the development of multilateral

150. See generally Nils Gilman, The New International Economic Order: A
Reintroduction, 6 HUMANITY 1 (2015) for a discussion of developed
countries role in the failure of the New International Economic Order of
the 1970s as an appropriate reminder in this regard.
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rules and institutions that are based on genuine consensus could greatly
advance.” 151

151. Schill, supra note 63, at 369.
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